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ABSTRACT
The democratization of AI tools for content generation, combined
with unrestricted access to mass media for all (e.g. through mi-
croblogging and social media), makes it increasingly hard for people
to distinguish fact from fiction. This raises the question of how in-
dividual opinions evolve in such a networked environment without
grounding in a known reality. The dominant approach to studying
this problem uses simple models from the social sciences on how
individuals change their opinions when exposed to their social
neighborhood, and applies them on large social networks.
We propose a novel model that incorporates two known social
phenomena: (i) Biased Assimilation: the tendency of individuals to
adopt other opinions if they are similar to their own; (ii) Backfire
Effect: the fact that an opposite opinion may further entrench some-
one in their stance, making their opinion more extreme instead of
moderating it. To the best of our knowledge this is the first DeGroot-
type opinion formation model that captures the Backfire Effect. A
thorough theoretical and empirical analysis of the proposed model
reveals intuitive conditions for polarization and consensus to exist,
as well as the properties of the resulting opinions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen an increasing amount of attention from the
computational social sciences in the study of opinion formation
and polarization over social networks, with applications ranging
from politics to brand perception [1, 9, 19]. Much of this research
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored.
For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).
MLG ’19, August 05, 2019, Anchorage, Alaska
© 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
ACM ISBN 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM.
https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
leverages pre-existing opinion formation models that have been
studied for decades [6, 23]. These models formalize the fact that
people form their opinions through interactions with others. One
of the best-known models is DeGroot’s model [16], which considers
an individual’s opinion as dynamic, assuming that it is updated as
the weighted average of the individual’s current opinion and those
of her social neighbors. The weights represent the strength of the
social connections.
DeGroot’s model is elegant and intuitive and it guarantees that
the opinions converge towards a consensus [16, 23]. Yet, the opin-
ions cannot polarize, contradicting empirical observations [4, 18].
Variants of DeGroot’s model have been proposed that incorporate
biased assimilation [11, 25], which is also known as confirmation
bias or myside bias and refers to the phenomenon where infor-
mation that corroborates someone’s beliefs affects those beliefs
more strongly than information that contradicts it [27]. Incorpo-
rating biased assimilation has been shown to potentially lead to
polarization [11] or opinion clustering [25].
An extreme manifestation of confirmation bias is a behavior
known in social psychology as the Backfire Effect [3, 28]. It refers
to the fact that, when an individual is faced with information that
contradicts her opinion, she will not only tend to discredit it, but
will also become more entrenched and thus extreme in her own
opinion. The backfire effect may help explain the emergence of
polarization. Yet, it has so far been overlooked by existing opinion
formation models.
Motivated by these observations, we propose the BEBA model,
a novel opinion formation model that simultaneously models the
Backfire Effect and Biased Assimilation. BEBA depends on a single—
intuitive, node-dependent—parameter βi , which we call the en-
trenchment of node i . It captures both the tendency of node i to be-
come more entrenched by opposing opinions and the bias towards
assimilating opinions favorable to its own. Our main contributions
are:
• We propose the BEBA model of opinion formation, which ac-
counts for both the Backfire Effect and Biased Assimilation (Sec-
tion 3). To the best of our knowledge BEBA is the first DeGroot-
type opinion formation model that incorporates the Backfire
Effect.
• We theoretically analyze the BEBA model in Section 4, studying
conditions for reaching consensus or polarization.
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• In Section 5 we empirically evaluate, on real and synthetic data,
the effect of both network topology and initial opinions on po-
larization / convergence.
2 RELATEDWORK
Opinion formation has been studied in diverse research fields, from
psychology and social sciences to economics and physics [6, 23].
The former mostly use empirical methods to understand the fac-
tors that affect opinion formation, while the latter mostly aim to
understand emergent behavior implied by these theories.
Two observations from psychology and social sciences relating
to our work are the biased assimilation and backfire effect [10, 26],
which state that individuals are more inclined to accept opinions
closer to their own [27], and that, when exposed to the opposite
opinion, individuals entrench themselves in their own opinions [7,
21, 28], respectively.
We study the common setting where opinions are formalized as
real values, formed through social interactions (see [23] and [6] for
surveys). The most popular models include the Voter model [8, 22],
DeGroot’s model [16], and the Friedkin-Johnsen model [17]. Yet,
none of these account for the biased assimilation or backfire effect.
There is work on modeling the fact that users are more influ-
enced by opinions closer to their own. The bounded confidence
models [14, 15, 20] assume that a user is influenced only by opin-
ions that are within ϵ of its own. The work of Kempe et al., [24]
assumes that there are different types of opinions and users are
influenced by opinions of similar types. Das et al., [12] consider a
biased version of the voter model that biases individuals to adopt
similar opinions. The work most closely related to ours is that of
Dandekar et al., [11] who propose a variant of DeGroot’s model to
capture the biased assimilation effect. In their model, the impor-
tance that a node attaches to the opinion of a neighbor depends on
their agreement. However, it does not model the backfire effect.
3 MODEL DEFINITION
In this section, we first describe existing models on which our work
builds and then introduce our nonlinear opinion formation BEBA
model, which is generalized from DeGroot’s model, and accounts
for both backfire effect and biased assimilation. Finally, we provide
a comparison between our BEBA and the related biased opinion
formation model on a simple example, to highlight their qualitative
differences.
3.1 Preliminaries and background
Notation. Let G = (V ,E) denote a connected undirected network,
withV = {1, ...,n} the set of nodes, and E ∈ V ×V the set ofm = |E |
edges, where (i, j) ∈ E iff (j, i) ∈ E. When the network is weighted,
wi j = w ji represents the weight of edge (i, j). We use N (i) to denote
the set of neighbors of node i: N (i) ≜ {j ∈ V |(i, j) ∈ E}.
In the considered models, opinions are real numbers within a
fixed interval [0, 1] or [−1, 1], depending on the model. To discrimi-
nate between the two, we use x to denote the opinions within [0, 1],
and y to denote the opinions that belong to [−1, 1]. All models we
consider in this work can be defined as dynamical systems, where
opinions are updated iteratively. We use xi (t) (resp. yi (t)) to denote
the opinion of node i at iteration (time) t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. We further
use x(t) and y(t) to denote the opinion vectors for the network
at time t . With xi (resp. yi ) we denote the opinion of node i after
convergences for t → ∞ (if that limit exists), and x (resp. y) to
denote the corresponding vectors.
DeGroot’s Model. This model [16] is an averaging opinion for-
mation model, where the individual’s opinion is determined by
the average of her own opinion and that of her neighbors. More
specifically, it is updated as follows:
xi (t + 1) =
wiixi (t) +∑j ∈N (i)wi jx j (t)
wii +
∑
j ∈N (i)wi j
(1)
wherewii represents the extent to which the node values its own
opinion, and wi j is the strength of the connection/friendship be-
tween node i and j . Iterative opinion updates will converge to a sta-
tionary state, where every node has the same opinion xi = x∗ [23].
Therefore, the model always reaches consensus, and never polar-
izes.
Biased Opinion Formation. The BOF model [11] generalizes
DeGroot’s to incorporate biased assimilation. Given a weighted
undirected graphG = (V ,E,w), every node i ∈ V is assigned a bias
parameter bi ≥ 0. Higher values of bi means that node i is more
biased. The opinion value xi (t) ∈ [0, 1] is interpreted as the degree
of support for opinion position 1 (i.e., the highest possible opinion
value), while 1 − xi (t) is the support for 0. It is defined as
xi (t + 1) = wiixi (t) + (xi (t))
bi si (t)
wii + (xi (t))bi si (t) + (1 − xi (t))bi (di − si (t))
where si (t) ≜ ∑j ∈N (i)wi jx j (t) is the weighted sum of i’s neigh-
bouring opinions, and di ≜
∑
j ∈N (i)wi j is the weighted degree of
node i . During the updating process, node i weighs confirming and
disconfirming evidence in a biased way: weighing the neighbor-
ing support for opinion 1 by (xi (t))bi , and that for opinion 0 by
(1 − xi (t))bi .
3.2 The BEBA model
We now define the BEBA model, which is a generalization of
DeGroot’s model that incorporates both biased assimilation and
backfire effect. To capture these phenomena, we adapt DeGroot’s
model by dynamically setting the weights on the edges. Let y(t)
denote the vector of opinions at time t , with yi (t) ∈ [−1, 1]. Then,
rather than using fixed weights as in DeGroot’s model, we propose
to let the weights be determined by the opinions as well. Specifi-
cally, for an edge (i, j) ∈ E we define the edge weightwi j (t) at time
t as
wi j (t) = βiyi (t)yj (t) + 1.
The product yi (t)yj (t) captures the degree of (dis)agreement be-
tween the opinions of node pair (i, j). The parameter βi > 0models
the influence for i that the (dis)agreement with node j will have
on the weight wi j (t): the larger, the stronger the biased assimila-
tion and backfire effects. We will refer to βi as the entrenchment
parameter of node i .
Given the weight wi j (t), the opinions in the BEBA model are
updated as in DeGroot’s model:
yi (t + 1) =
wiiyi (t) +∑j ∈N (i)wi j (t)yj (t)
wii +
∑
j ∈N (i)wi j (t)
(2)
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Note that when βi = 0, BEBA’s update rule is identical to that of
DeGroot’s (Eq. (1)) for unweighted networks. When βi , 0, we
discriminate two cases depending onwi j (t):
(1) wi j (t) < 0: This casemodels the backfire effect where βiyi (t)yj (t)
< −1. Since βi > 0, yi (t)yj (t) < 0, that is, nodes i and j hold
opposing views. Multiplying yj (t) with this negative weight
wi j (t) in the summation in the numerator leads to a contribu-
tion of the same sign as yi (t), while adding the negative weight
to the denominator reduces it, inflating the resulting quotient.
The combination of these two effects models the backfire effect.
(2) wi j (t) > 0: This case models biased assimilation, including two
subcases:
(a) −1 < βiyi (t)yj (t) < 0: Here nodes i and j hold opposing
but not too different opinions. Node i critically evaluates
the conflicting opinion of node j, but still assimilates it to a
reduced extent.
(b) 0 < βiyi (t)yj (t): Since βi > 0, node i and j have both positive
or negative opinions here, resulting in an increased weight
wi j (t). In this case, node i assimilates the opinion of neighbor
j more strongly if the extent of their agreement is stronger.
Note that the denominator in Eq. (2) can become 0 resulting in
a diverging opinion, or negative causing an unnatural opinion re-
versal. We consider this situation to be beyond the model’s validity
region, and thus define the BEBA model as:
yi (t + 1) =
{
sgn(yi (t)) if wii +∑j ∈N (i)wi j (t) ≤ 0,
wiiyi (t )+∑j∈N (i )wi j (t )yj (t )
wii+
∑
j∈N (i )wi j (t ) otherwise.
Moreover, for a small denominator the resulting opinions may
fall outside the range [−1, 1]. To address this, we additionally clip
negative values at −1 and positive values at 1.
3.3 Comparison of the BEBA and BOF models
There is a similarity between the BOF and our BEBA model, in
that both alter the weights of the DeGroot’s. Consider a simple star
graph consisting of five nodes where node 1 is in the center, and
focus on one iteration of opinion updating on node 1. In this case,
we can observe how the two models update the opinion of a single
node, given the opinions of her neighborhood.
First, we deal with the fact that BOF model assumes only positive
opinion values, while our model assumes opinions being both posi-
tive and negative. Note that the value range of opinions is important
in both models, since the BOF model weights the opinion values,
while our model exploits the disagreement in the sign. To compare
the models, we assume positive opinion values xi (t) ∈ [0, 1] on all
nodes in the graph, and use them to implement an update of the
BOF model. For our model, we transform opinions to the range
[−1, 1] by setting yi (t) = 2xi (t) − 1. Then we compute the value
y1(t + 1) as defined in BEBA, and rescale back.
In our experiment we assume xi (t) identical for all i = 2, 3, 4, 5,
and xi (t) ∈ [0, 1] for all nodes. We set w11 = 1 for both models,
b1 = 1 for BOF, and consider the values of 1 and 2.5 for β1 in BEBA
model. The opinion value x1(t + 1) for both models, as a function
of x2,3,4,5(t) and x1(t) is shown in Figure 1. The difference between
the two models becomes clear when x1(t) takes extreme values (i.e.,
0 or 1).
Figure 1: Opinion Formation on the Star Graph
(b)(a)
Figure 2: x1(t + 1) as a function of xi (t), (a) β1 = 1, b1 = 1,
x1(t) = 0; (b) β1 = 2.5, b1 = 1, x1(t) = 0.25.
Figure 2(a) shows the curves for the two models when x1(t) = 0.
In BOF, the opinion x1(t + 1) remains unchanged at value 0. This
is true regardless of the value of b1. Thus, extreme nodes never
change their opinions, even a little, even when they are not biased
at all. However, according to the biased assimilation, unbiased
individuals should be influenced by similar opinions, while even
extreme nodes assimilate opinions that are close to their own. In
contrast, our model better captures the biased assimilation in this
case. In Figure 2(a), for β1 = 1, which corresponds to a mildly
biased node, the opinion of node 1 can be moderated by that of her
neighbors to different extents, while x1(t + 1) never exceeds 0.5.
Therefore, extreme nodes are not stuck in the extremes.
To better understand the backfire effect, we increase β1 to 2.5,
and set x1(t) = 0.25 as shown in Figure 2(b). We observe that when
the disagreement between node 1 and her neighbors becomes large
(i.e., > 0.9), x1(t + 1) drops under 0.25, until it becomes completely
extreme with value 0.
From the plots in Figure 2 we also observe that for the different
combinations of β1 and x1(t), there exists a value of the neighboring
opinions that causes the largest change in x1(t + 1). For example,
when β1 = 1 and x1(t) = 0, neighboring opinion of around 0.75
is the most influential as shown in Figure 2(a); for β1 = 2.5 and
x1(t) = 0.25, opinion around 0.7 is the most influential according
to Figure 2(b).
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4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This section contains theoretical analysis of the BEBAmodel for two
settings1. First we investigate the dynamics of opinions for a single
agent in a fixed environment, and secondly we study the dynamics
of polarization for all nodes in a connected social network.
4.1 A single agent in a fixed environment
Here we theoretically analyze the limit behavior of a single agent’s
opinion in an environment with a fixed opinion. An analysis of this
type has been done for the BOF model [11]. The setup is admittedly
somewhat artificial but helps to gain a better understanding of the
model. It has been deemed realistic in cases where the fixed environ-
ment consists of the news media, billboards, etc. [11]. It also models
the situation where the single agent is connected to a network that
is large enough such that adding it will not meaningfully affect the
network.
For the agent i , we denote y(t) ∈ [−1, 1] its opinion at time t ,
β > 0 its entrenchment parameter, and y its converged opinion
(i.e., limt→∞ y(t)). We assume the agent weighs its own opinion
withwii = w . For simplicity, we only consider the situation where
the environment contains one node, but it should be noted that
the analysis below can be easily generalized to several nodes. Let
p ∈ [−1, 1] be the fixed environmental opinion. Then, according to
BEBA, the agent updates its opinion as follows:
y(t + 1) =
{
sgn(y(t)) if w + βpy(t) + 1 ≤ 0,
wy(t )+βp2y(t )+p
w+βpy(t )+1 otherwise.
Before stating a theorem that quantitatively characterizes the
limit y, we consider the behavior. [Case 1:] For sufficiently small
entrenchment β (i.e., not biased), the fixed environment’s opinion p
will be sufficiently attracting such that y = p regardless of y(t). The
same is true when p = 0: the neutral opinion is never polarizing and
thus always attracting. [Case 2:] On the other hand, for sufficiently
large entrenchment β (i.e., biased), the limit y will depend on the
similarity of initial opinion y(t) with the environment’s opinion p:
[Case 2a:] if y(t) is similar to p, p should have an attracting effect
on y(t) such that its limit y = p; [Case 2b:] if y(t) is very different
from p, however, the backfire effect will cause the agent’s opinion
to diverge from p, such that y = sgn(y(t)). [Case 2c:] Between Case
2a and Case 2b, there will be a ‘sweet spot’ where y(t) is neither
sufficiently similar to p for y(t) to converge to p, nor sufficiently dif-
ferent for it to diverge to sgn(y(t)). This is an unstable equilibrium
where y(t) remains constant through time, i.e., y = y(t).
This intuition is formalized in the following theorem. For con-
ciseness and transparency, we state it for the situation where p ≤ 0.
It is trivial to adapt the theorem for p ≥ 0.
Theorem 4.1. Depending on the value of β relative to p:
Case 1: When p = 0 or β < −1/p, the agent’s opinion always con-
verges to p, i.e., y = p.
Case 2: When p < 0 and β ≥ −1/p, there are three possibilities de-
pending on how similary(t) is top. (This situation is illustrated
in Figure 3.)
1Supplemental materials including theoretical proofs, dataset information, and
more experimental results at https://www.dropbox.com/sh/4gdj2bg4g3wbumi/AACjy-
iOnjiRknK4BprIN9Y2a?dl=0.
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of Case 2 from Theorem 4.1
(i.e. p < 0 and β ≥ −1/p). [Case 2a:] For values of y(t) in the
green range, y(t)will converge to y = p. [Case 2b:] For values
of y(t) in the red range, y(t) will diverge to y = 1. [Case 2c:]
For y(t) = − 1βp , y(t) will not change such that y = − 1βp .
a: If y(t) < − 1βp , y(t) will be sufficiently attracted to p such
that y = p.
b: If y(t) > − 1βp , y(t) will diverge away from p such that
y = sgn(y(t)) = 1.
c: If y(t) = − 1βp , y(t) will remain constant through time, such
that y = − 1βp .
Theorem 4.1 already suggests that opinions under the BEBA
model evolve to one of three possible states: consensus (Case 1 and
Case 2a), polarization (Case 2b), and an unstable state of persistent
disagreement (Case 2c).
4.2 Polarization and consensus for general
networks and initial opinions
Here we extend from the single agent to a group of individuals
that can update their opinions at any time step t . The dynamics of
polarization are investigated theoretically with respect to different
values of the entrenchment parameter. It was argued by the authors
of the BOFmodel that homophily alone, without biased assimilation
was not sufficient for polarization [11]. In our BEBA model, the
backfire effect and biased assimilation, without homophily, are
sufficient to lead to polarization or consensus, depending on the
parameters and the initial opinions. The theorem below makes
this clear, by providing easy-to-realize sufficient conditions for
polarization or consensus to occur.
Theorem 4.2. Let G = (V ,E) be any connected unweighted undi-
rected network. For all i ∈ V , yi (t) ∈ (−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1) is the opinion of
node i at time t , letwii = 1 and βi = β > 0 for all i ∈ V . Denote y(t)
the opinion vector ofG at time t , |y(t)| is the vector with the absolute
values of all opinions, and min(y(t)) is the minimum element in y(t).
Then,
(1) Polarization: If β > 1[min( |y(0) |)]2 , ∀i ∈ V , |yi | = 1.
(2) Consensus: If β < 1[max( |y(0) |)]2 , there exists a unique y
∗ ∈
[−max (|y(0)|) ,max (|y(0)|)] such that yi = y∗, ∀i ∈ V .
A special case of particular theoretical interest is whenmin (|y(0)|)
= max (|y(0)|). Then there are only two different initial opinions in
the network, with the same absolute value but opposite signs (i.e.
they could represent ’for’ and ’against’ an issue of interest). In this
case, the sufficient conditions also become necessary conditions,
and a borderline situation emerges to which we refer as persistent
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disagreement. It can be proved concisely by relying on Theorem 4.2,
and thus we state it as a Corollary:
Corollary 4.3. Let G = (V1,V2,E) be any connected unweighted
undirected network. For all i ∈ V = V1 ∪ V2, let wii = 1 and βi =
β > 0. Assume for all i ∈ V1, yi (0) = y0, where 0 < y0 < 1; while for
all i ∈ V2, yi (0) = −y0. Then,
(1) Polarization: If β > 1
y20
, ∀i ∈ V1 ∪V2, |yi | = 1.
(2) Persistent disagreement: If β = 1
y20
(i.e., wi j (t) = 0 if i ∈ V1
and j ∈ V2), ∀i ∈ V1, yi (t ′) = y0 for all t ′ ≥ 0, and ∀i ∈ V2,
yi (t ′) = −y0 for all t ′ ≥ 0.
(3) Consensus: If β < 1
y20
, then there exists a uniquey∗ ∈ (−y0,y0)
such that ∀i ∈ V , yi = y∗.
Intriguingly, these conditions in the Theorem and Corollary
are independent of the network structure and depend only on the
entrenchment parameter β and the opinion vector at time 0. Yet, it
should be noted that the value of the consensus and the eventual
polarized state do depend on the network structure. Moreover, the
network structure, and the distribution of the opinions over it,
do determine whether polarization or consensus will arise when
neither of the sufficient conditions of Theorem 4.2 are satisfied.
These claims are confirmed in experiments in the next section.
5 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In Section 4 we provided sufficient conditions for our model to reach
consensus or polarization. In this section we perform an experi-
mental analysis of how these two phenomena manifest themselves
on real and synthetic networks. Our goal is to answer the following
questions:
• In the case that the network reaches consensus, what is the value
of the consensus opinion, and how does the network structure,
β , and the initial opinion vector affect this value?
• In the case that the opinions polarize, what is the state of the
polarization and how is it affected by the initial opinions, β , and
the structure of the networks?
We use both real-world and synthetic data in our experiments.
The real datasets include Zachary’s Karate Club network [30] (i.e.,
real network used with synthetic opinion vectors) and six Twitter
networks with given opinions for different events ranging from
political elections to sports activities [13, 31] (i.e., real network and
real opinions obtained from sentiment analysis). See the supplement
for data statistics. The synthetic networks, which are used with
synthetic opinions, are:
• Erdős-Rényi (ER) networks G(n, ρ) have binomial degree distri-
butions, where ρ is the edge connection probability between
nodes [5].
• Watts-Strogatz (WS) networks G(n,K , 1) have the small world
property withK being the average degree, andwe fix the rewiring
probability to be 1 (i.e., random graph), thus only refer to K [29].
• Barabási-Albert (BA) networksG(n,M0,M) are scale-free, where
M0 is the number of initial nodes and M the number of nodes
that a new node is connected to [2].
(b)
(d)(c)
𝒚(0)(a)
Figure 4: For the Karate network: (a) the distribution of βP
(i.e., the smallest β that results in polarization) for 10000 ran-
dom opinion vectors (uniform on [−1, 1]); For one opinion
vector, (b) the variance of all converged y as β increases from
0 to 10; (c) consensus opinion values for β ∈ [0, 2.1]; (d) final
converged opinions for each of the nodes.
5.1 The influence of the entrenchment β
From Theorem 4.2, we know the stationary opinion vector y of
our model polarizes when β > 1[min( |y(0) |)]2 , and reaches consensus
when β < 1[max( |y(0) |)]2 . However, these limits are far away from
each other and polarization may occur at much lower values of β in
practice, similarly consensus for higher β . We now take the Karate
network as an example and examine the relation between β and
polarization experimentally using random initial opinion vectors.
Let βP denote the threshold between non-polarization, which is
equivalent to consensus in our case here, and polarization for any
pair of network and opinion vector. Figure 4(a) shows the distribu-
tion of the empirical βP values for 10000 different random opinion
vectors, where yi (0) is uniform within [−1, 1]. We observe that
the threshold for polarization is much smaller than the theoretical
value, which should be lager than 104. However, the empirical value
of βP is below 5 for most of the y(0), and never exceeds 7.
In Figure 4(b), the variance of the stationary opinion vector is
plotted as a function of β , for one of the 10000 opinion vectors.
When there is consensus the variance is zero, while when the
variance is greater than zero, polarization is obtained (i.e., different
variances correspond to different polarized states). We observe
that as β increases, the opinion vector converges from consensus to
polarized states. Empirically, no persistent disagreement is achieved.
For this y(0), polarization is shown if β > 2.1 such that βP = 2.1.
When reaching consensus, Figure 4(c) shows that the consensus
value becomes less neutral as β increases. This is true for 78.74% of
the 10000 vectors on Karate network. Meanwhile, different βs do
not necessarily result in the same polarized state (see Figure 4(d)).
The heatmap shows different polarized states for different values
of β for this y(0).
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: For 1000 random y(0) onKarate network: (a) consen-
sus opinion when β = 1; (b) mean polarized opinion when
β = 10.
(b)(a)
Figure 6: Based on one ER (n = 100, ρ = 0.0606), one WS (n =
100,K = 3), and one BA network (n = 100,M0 = 4,M = 3):
(a) distribution of βP for 1000 random opinion vectors; (b)
for 100 opinion vectors, mean y(0) vs. the consensus value
(β = 1).
5.2 The influence of the opinion vector y(0)
In this experiment, we investigate the influence of y(0) on the con-
sensus opinion value and the mean polarized opinion. Figure 5
shows that the consensus value and the mean polarized opinion
are strongly correlated to the mean of y(0). Meanwhile, Figure 5(b)
shows that in the case of polarization, opinion vectors with similar
initial means may result in quite different polarized states because
the placements of the opinions on nodes differ. Also, y(0) with dif-
ferent means may result in similar polarization (i.e., mean polarized
opinion).
Then we analyze two real datasets Tw:Club (i.e., Barcelona get-
ting the first place in La-liga 2016) and Tw: Sport (Champions
League final in 2015 between Juventus and Real Madrid), which
have the same network but different initial opinion vectors. It is
found that the βP is 11.7 for Tw:Club and 3.3 for Tw:Sport, which
indicates the Champions League final gets polarized more easily
than the other event.
5.3 The influence of the network topology G
In this experiment, we study how the topology affects the βP for
the same (set of) y(0), as well as the stationary opinion vectors
of our model. To this end, we generated networks with the three
random network models, with the same number of nodes, intialized
with the same opinion vectors.
Table 1: βP for real-world twitter datasets
Network βP Network βP Network βP
Tw:GoT 2.9 Tw:Club 3.3 Tw:US 4.9
Tw:UK 7.5 Tw:Delhi 7.7 Tw:Sport 11.7
We observe that for networks with the same number of nodes
and similar numbers of edges, different network properties result
in different dynamics of polarization. Figure 6(a) shows that for
the same set of y(0), the distributions of the βP value for the three
models. It shows that the βP has a larger mean in the WS model,
indicating networks with this structure may be more robust against
polarization. We also observe the standard deviation of the βP
values for the BA distribution is larger, which appears to be due to
’hub’ nodes, whose opinions strongly affect the value of βP .
Figure 6(b) plots the consensus values reached by a set of 100
randomopinion vectors on the three networks. The shapes of scatter
plots become increasingly compact from the BA model, the ER
model, to the WS model, corroborating the larger variance in the
opinion dynamics on BA networks.
The parameters in each model also affect the dynamics, see the
supplement. For example, when the edge probability ρ in the ER
model increases from a small number, which guarantees a connected
network, to 1, βP varies less for ER models with similar ρ. The
experimental results are similar for the consensus value, and the
polarized opinion. Not only the number of edges has an influence on
the dynamics of polarization, but also the placement of the edges.
5.4 Real-world dataset analysis
Based on the six real-world twitter datasets [13, 31], we investigate
how easily each event gets polarized opinions, namely the value
of βP . It is shown in Table 1 that political events are apparently
less likely to polarize, except the US one. While the sport or TV
events are more likely get polarized, except when people had to bet
instead of supporting (i.e., Tw:Club).
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Modeling how opinions evolve when individuals interact in social
networks is an important computational social science challenge
that has received renewed attention recently. The availability of
realistic models of this type may have substantial real-life impact
on a variety of applications, from political campaigns design, to
conflict prevention and mitigation.
A large number of models have been proposed in the literature.
To the best of our knowledge, however, none of them model the
so-called Backfire Effect: the fact that individuals, when exposed to
a strongly opposing view, will not be moderated, but rather become
more entrenched in their opinion.
Here we proposed the BEBA model, which models both Biased
Assimilation and Backfire Effect. It is governed by one parameter
(which can vary over the individuals), called the entrenchment
parameter, determining the strength of both. The BEBA model
naturally generates different behaviors: from convergence to a
consensus, to polarization.
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Theoretical and empirical analyses demonstrate that the result-
ing model is not only realistic, its behavior also provides an in-
teresting view on the interplay between network structure, the
entrenchment parameter, and the opinions.
These properties make the BEBA model a useful tool for simu-
lating the effect of interventions, such as editing the network (e.g.
by facilitating communication between particular pairs of individu-
als), altering the initial opinions (e.g. through targeted information
campaigns), or affecting the entrenchment of particular individuals
(e.g. through education).
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